Dengue Contingency Planning: From Research to Policy and Practice by Runge-Ranzinger, Silvia et al.
RESEARCHARTICLE
Dengue Contingency Planning: From
Research to Policy and Practice
Silvia Runge-Ranzinger1,2*, Axel Kroeger2,3, Piero Olliaro2, Philip J. McCall3,
Gustavo Sánchez Tejeda4, Linda S. Lloyd5, LokmanHakim6, LeighR. Bowman3,
Olaf Horstick1, Giovanini Coelho7
1 Institute of Public Health, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany, 2 Special Programme for
Research and Training WHO-TDR, Geneva, Switzerland, 3 Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, Liverpool,
United Kingdom, 4 Ministry of Health,Mexico City, Mexico, 5 Public Health Consultant, San Diego,
California, United States of America,6 Ministryof Health, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 7 Ministry of Health,
Brasilia, Brazil
* s.runge-ranzinger@t-online.de
Abstract
Background
Dengue is an increasingly incident disease across many parts of the world. In response, an
evidence-based handbook to translate research into policy and practice was developed.
This handbook facilitates contingency planning as well as the development and use of early
warning and response systems for dengue fever epidemics, by identifying decision-making
processes that contribute to the success or failure of dengue surveillance, as well as trig-
gers that initiate effective responses to incipient outbreaks.
Methodology/Principalfindings
Available evidence was evaluated using a step-wise process that included systematic litera-
ture reviews, policymaker and stakeholder interviews, a study to assess dengue contin-
gency planning and outbreakmanagement in 10 countries, and a retrospective logistic
regression analysis to identify alarmsignals for an outbreak warning system using datasets
from five dengue endemic countries. Best practices for managing a dengue outbreak are
provided for key elements of a dengue contingency plan including timely contingency plan-
ning, the importanceof a detailed, context-specific dengue contingency plan that clearly dis-
tinguishes between routine and outbreak interventions, surveillance systems for outbreak
preparedness, outbreak definitions, alert algorithms,managerial capacity, vector control
capacity, and clinical management of large caseloads. Additionally, a computer-assisted
early warning system, which enables countries to identify and respond to context-specific
variables that predict forthcomingdengue outbreaks, has been developed.
Conclusions/Significance
Most countries do not have comprehensive, detailed contingency plans for dengue out-
breaks. Countries tend to rely on intensified vector control as their outbreak response, with
minimal focus on integratedmanagement of clinical care, epidemiological, laboratory and
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vector surveillance, and risk communication. The Technical Handbook for Surveillance,
DengueOutbreak Prediction/Detection andOutbreakResponse seeks to provide countries
with evidence-based best practices to justify the declaration of an outbreak and the mobili-
zation of the resources required to implement an effective dengue contingency plan.
Author Summary
An evidence-basedhandbook was generated to facilitate deployment of dengue surveil-
lance and response systems for timely and effectivemanagement of outbreaks, and to
identify the factors required for success. Evidence was evaluated using literature reviews,
policymaker and stakeholder interviews, assessment of dengue contingency planning and
outbreak management in ten endemic countries, and a statistical analysis to identify out-
break early warning signs in five countries. Best practices for managing dengue outbreaks
included timely and context-specific dengue contingency plans that distinguished between
routine practices and outbreak interventions, surveillance systems, outbreak definitions,
alert algorithms, and managerial, clinical and vector control capacity. A computer-assisted
early warning system was developed to enable each locality to develop its own context-spe-
cific scheme. Today, most countries do not have comprehensive, detailed contingency
plans for dengue outbreaks, responding simply by intensifying vector control, with mini-
mal focus on integrated management of clinical care, epidemiological, laboratory and vec-
tor surveillance, and risk communication. To rectify this, our handbook provides
countries with evidence-basedbest practices to justify the declaration of an outbreak and
for the mobilization and management of appropriate resources required to implement a
dengue contingency plan.
Introduction
Responding to the rapidly increasing public health importance of dengue, the 2002 World
Health Assembly ResolutionWHA55.17 urged greater commitment to dengue among Member
States and throughout theWorld Health Organisation (WHO). One response of particular sig-
nificance was the Revision of the International Health Regulations (WHA58.3) in 2005, where
dengue was included as an example of a disease that would constitute a public health emer-
gency of international concern. It was against this background that theWorld Health Organi-
zation’s Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (WHO/TDR)
initiated a Dengue ScientificWorking Group (SWG) of 60 experts from 20 countries, which
met in October 2006 to review existing knowledge on dengue and establish priorities for future
dengue research [1]. The research priorities identifiedwere organized into four major research
streams and those for dengue surveillance and outbreak response included the following pri-
mary recommendations:
➢ Development and utilization of early warning and response systems;
➢ Identification of triggers that initiate effective response to incipient epidemics;
➢ Decision-makingprocesses that result in a declaration of a state of emergency;
➢ Analysis of the factors that contribute to the success or failure of national programs in the
context of dengue surveillance and outbreak management.
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At the same time, a discussion began that was centred on the need for an evidence base to
better inform policy recommendations. TheWHODengue Guidelines for Diagnosis, Treat-
ment, Prevention and Control [2] was followed by theWHOHandbook for Guideline Devel-
opment [3], which stressed specifically the need for high-level evidencewhen developing
guidelines, particularly through systematic literature reviews. The importance of systematic
reviews for linking research and practice was also highlighted by others [4], with one [5] stating
“policymakers need systematic reviews that are policy relevant, rigorous, and translatable to
their local context, actionable, timely and well communicated”. With this in mind, WHO/TDR
together with theWHO/NTD (Department for Neglected Tropical Diseases) and WHO
Regional Offices set out to develop an evidence-basedhandbook [6] for early dengue outbreak
detection and response. The project was financially supported by a grant from the European
Commission (grant number m281803) to the IDAMS network (www.idams.eu) within the 7th
Framework Programme and by TDR/WHO.
Accordingly, this handbook is not intended to be a direct implementation guideline but a
framework for developing a national plan, requiring local adaptations to acknowledge fine-
scale programme components. The latter point takes into account that contingency response
planning requires consideration and incorporation of numerous contextual details such as rec-
ognition of the structure of the health and vector control services, available infrastructure and
budget, human resources, willingness of staff to cooperate, and many others. Here we present
an outline of the handbook, summarizing the main components of a national contingency plan
for dengue outbreaks and indicating the key elements that are evidence-basedand those that
require further research efforts.
Methods
The development of this evidence-basedhandbook for dengue contingency planning used a
step-wise approach. The first step established an overviewby identifying knowledge gaps and
commissioning new systematic literature reviews covering the following topic areas: a) dengue
vector control [7–16] b) outbreak response [17]; c) dengue disease surveillance [18, 19] and
dengue vector surveillance [20]; and d) economic aspects [21].
In a second step, mixed (qualitative and quantitative) research methods were used to iden-
tify a) factors leading to the success or failure of national dengue control programmes, b) deci-
sion-making that resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency, c)
stakeholders`perceptions of their contingency plans, and d) gaps regarding the practical appli-
cation of contingency plans. These studies were conducted in Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Indo-
nesia and Thailand [22] and were complemented by a comparative analysis of dengue
contingency plans from 13 countries [23]. Finally, a multi-country study was conducted that
assessed dengue contingency planning and outbreak management in 10 countries [24]. The
country selection process varied from study to study based on the dengue burden, information
available for the information searched, willingness to participate or a history of recent dengue
outbreaks, where appropriate.
In the third step, a retrospective analysis of the predictive ability of variables to warn of
forthcoming outbreaks was conducted. Epidemiological and meteorological variables were
analysed using datasets from Brazil, Dominican Republic, Malaysia, Mexico and Vietnam [25].
These were selected based on dengue endemicity, dengue burden and those countries with a
recent history of dengue outbreaks. In common with the existing scientific literature, the
model identified a number of variables that could be used to predict dengue outbreaks with suf-
ficient sensitivity and relatively few false alarms. This model is currently being evaluated in a
prospective feasibility and cost-effectiveness study in Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico, as part of an
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evaluation of a staged response system, designed to gradually implement timely interventions
in response to weak or stronger alert signals.
In a last step, we developed a computer-assisted early warning system designed to run on a
wide variety of platforms such as Microsoft Excel, STATA, R and SPSS. Such software was
developed to build capacity in countries that currently lack the resources to implement predic-
tive dengue technologies. A user-guide was prepared to describe and explain the early warning
system, how to use it to identify potential alarm signals at the district level, and how pro-
grammemanagers might use these indicators to provide timely evidence-basedalerts to subse-
quent dengue outbreaks. These developments can equip regional epidemiologists with the
technical capacity to rapidly obtain the information required to formulate timely outbreak
response.
NB: A formal assessment of quality of evidence of the included literature was not performed
in this paper—this article describes the developmental process of the handbook. The material
used for the development of the handbook, however, included the highest available evidence
for each subsection: a) Guidelines and Handbooks (2,3,26 and 27), b) Systematic Reviews and
Meta-analysis (7–22), c) RCTs/cRCTs (28), d) Cohort Studies (29–32), e) Mixed-Method
Study Designs (22–24,33 and 34), f)Others (primary research–non controlled and reviews-
non systematic) (4,5, 25, 34, 40-67), and g) Reports (1,68–70).
Results
Successful outbreak detection (the term “outbreak” is used here synonymously with “epi-
demic”) and response is reliant on a representative and timely surveillance system reflecting
the transmission of disease; that is, an effective alert mechanism linking surveillance data to the
best possible evidence-basedand cost-effective response strategies. The main purposes of a sur-
veillance system are to a) monitor and document disease trends and b) detect outbreaks at an
early stage. A contingency plan links these elements together and describes additionally the
timing and response actions to be taken when an outbreak is imminent or has begun. In the fol-
lowing sections, we highlight different aspects of contingency planning and provide detailed
information on each component.
Timely contingency planning
In a comparison of existing practices in 10 countries in Asia and Latin America [24], outbreak
response plans varied in quality and comprehensiveness, particularly regarding early response
measures as well as detailed specifications of actions to be taken. Harrington et al. [23] com-
pared 13 country contingency plans for dengue from Asia, Latin America and Australia, and
one international plan by theWorld Health Organization. The authors found that outbreak
governance was weak, in part due to a lack of clarity of the roles of stakeholders, poor surveil-
lance contributed to delays in response, there was a lack of combining routine data with addi-
tional alerts, and the absence of triggers to initiate an early response. Frequently, an outbreak
was undefined and early response mechanisms based on alert signals were neglected. Therefore
it was concluded that a model contingency plan for dengue outbreak prediction, detection and
response, including resource planning, training, monitoring and evaluation, could help
national disease control authorities to develop their own more detailed and functional context-
specific plans. Badurdeen et al. [24] also found that information on dengue was based on com-
pulsory notification and reporting (“passive surveillance”), coupled with laboratory confirma-
tion (in all participating Latin American countries and some Asian countries) or by using a
clinical syndromic definition. Seven countries [24] had sentinel sites with active dengue report-
ing, and some also had virological surveillance. Six countries had a formal definition for dengue
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outbreaks, distinguishing them from seasonal incident peaks. Countries collected data on a
range of warning signs that could identify outbreaks early, but none had developed a systematic
approach to identify and respond to the early stages of an outbreak. Through discussions at an
expertmeeting, suggestions were made for the development of a more standardised approach
in the form of a model contingency plan, together with agreed upon outbreak definitions and
country-specific risk assessment schemes, in order to initiate timely response activities [24].
Surveillance systems for outbreak preparedness
Surveillancesystems and contingency plans. The main components of a dengue surveil-
lance system are summarised in Fig 1. The evidence for their relative value and usefulness is
discussed below. Runge-Ranzinger et al. [18, 19] systematically reviewed the usefulness of den-
gue disease surveillance for outbreak detection and programme planning. Four cohort-based
studies [29–32] revealed remarkably high levels of under-reporting in the surveillance systems
by calculating “expansion factors” (e.g., how many more cases exist in addition to reported
cases). Such high levels of underestimated caseloads hamper the prediction of outbreaks and
several studies [35–40] demonstrated that enhancement methods such as laboratory support,
sentinel reporting and staff motivation contributed to improvements in dengue reporting, and
thus to a more precise, real-time picture of dengue expansion. Alert signals used for syndromic
surveillance that are potentially useful in an early warning system are described below under
point Four.
In addition to these findings, qualitative research on dengue surveillance and control pro-
grams [22, 33, 68] identified several issues that resulted in low sensitivity of case detection,
Fig 1. Main components of a dengue surveillance system.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0004916.g001
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including relying on only a clinical assessment for dengue diagnosis, low patient demand for
services, low specificity of the DF/ DHF/ DSS case classification, limited acceptability of the
monitoring system at all levels, and case reporting limited to the public sector, to certain age
groups, or to in-patient cases. Recommendations from the authors suggest that timeliness in
reporting could be improved by: 1) establishing a common understanding on the purpose and
objectives of surveillance across all stakeholders; 2) using simplified and standardized case defi-
nitions and improving dengue case classifications; 3) improving feedback of reported data to
stakeholders; 4) ensuring consistent data flow and clear reporting channels; 5) creating addi-
tional active, sentinel and syndromic surveillancebased on a clear rationale; 6) using data from
virological and serological surveillance; 7) conducting research on appropriate thresholds/ alert
indicators or risk assessment tools for dengue outbreak detection, and 8) ensuring that surveil-
lance data, alert mechanisms and evidence-basedresponse are linked and embedded in proper
contingency planning.
Information about the circulating serotype/genotype should be documented and used for
surveillancepurposes. According to Harrington et al. [23], a national contingency plan should
state precisely how laboratory surveillancewould function during an outbreak. For example,
will laboratory surveillance just be used to confirm an outbreak or will it be performed continu-
ously throughout an outbreak?What tests should be used and to whom should the results be
sent? Details of laboratory-specific issues to be considered in country dengue contingency
plans are: 1) laboratory confirmation of reported cases, 2) how to report positive results directly
to the surveillance system, 3) details for viral isolation, PCR, NS-1, ELISA, serological confir-
mation by IgM and IgG, use of rapid diagnostic tests, storage and transport of samples as
appropriate (seeWHO [2]), 4) purpose of tests, test results and their interpretation, 5) a flow-
chart describing the timing of tests and destination of samples, 6) laboratory-specificprocesses
of outbreak investigation and confirmation, 7) quality control, training and capacity building,
and 8) prevention of stock-outs.
Definition of a dengue case. For early detection of dengue outbreaks, the definition and
classification of a dengue case is important. However, clinical diagnosis of a dengue case lead-
ing to the diagnosis of “probable dengue” is almost impossible because of a number of similar
febrile conditions. The 2009WHO [2] case classification suggests a case definition that can be
used with or without laboratory parameters. It also suggests a distinction between dengue and
severe dengue, which is important for clinical management but also for epidemic preparedness.
This allows a rough estimate of the clinical servicesnecessary to cope with a large-scale dengue
outbreak and facilitate triage processes. Horstick et al. [8] compared the 1997 and 2009WHO
dengue case classifications in a systematic review. The authors found that use of the 2009
WHO dengue case classification resulted in determination of severe dengue with a sensitivity
between 59–98% (88–98% within the four prospective studies) and a specificity of 41–99%
(99% in the four prospective studies) comparing to the 1997 WHO classification: sensitivity
24.8% - 89.9% (24.8%/74%: prospective studies), specificity: 25%/100% (100%: prospective
study). It was concluded that the 2009 WHO classification had clear performance advantages
for clinical and epidemiological use when compared with the 1997 classification.
Vector surveillance. A systematic review by Bowman et al. [20] investigated the usefulness
of entomological indicators as outbreak predictors. Eleven of eighteen studies included in the
review generated Stegomyia indices from combined larval and pupal data while only three stud-
ies reported adult vector data. Of thirteen studies that investigated associations between vector
indices and dengue cases, four reported positive correlations, four found no correlation and
five reported ambiguous or inconclusive associations. Additionally, six of seven studies that
measured Breteau indices reported dengue transmission at levels below the widely accepted
threshold of 5. Bowman et al. [20] found there was little evidence of any quantifiable
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association between vector indices and dengue transmission that could be used reliably for out-
break prediction and that single values of the Breteau or other indices were not reliable univer-
sal dengue transmission thresholds. The authors recommended further studies using more
appropriate study designs, e.g., standardized sampling protocols that adequately consider den-
gue spatial heterogeneity, and less reliance on universal thresholds; historic localised vector
abundance metrics are considered a more reliable indicator of fluctuation and risk. Addition-
ally, the authors found that operational issues of routine vector surveillancewere often ham-
pered by a lack of resources, lack of involvement of local level personnel in decision-making,
limitations in supervision, increasing vector resistance to insecticides, and difficulty in the
interpretation of entomological indices [24].
Outbreak definition
Among the systematic reviews performed to date, considerable variation was observed in the
number and application of outbreak definitions, and definitions have been numerous, non-
standardised and inconsistently applied [24]. In order to ensure that an early warning system
for dengue outbreaks is effective, efficient and timely, outbreak definitionsmust be able to dis-
tinguish between true outbreaks and seasonal increases in dengue. Therefore, outbreaks were
defined as caseloads of an order much larger than would otherwise be expected during the
respective season and/ or occurring in unexpected locations. This task is complex but has been
somewhat simplified by the use of the Endemic Channel. Outbreak definitions defined using
the Endemic Channel often base thresholds on 2 standard deviations (SD) above the mean
number of historic dengue cases, which closely reflects the 1.96 SDs used in confidence esti-
mates to capture 95% of the variation about the mean. However, such values are often applied
across large spatial dimensions, resulting in the loss of information that may be reflective of the
localised transmission dynamics inherent to dengue [25]. Considering this, models need to be
parameterised according to the context [41]. In support of this evidence, Bowman et al. [25]
also found that the multiplier of the standard deviationmay be context-dependent and
reported that 1.25SD could be used as an efficientmultiplier. Brady et al. [34] modelled five
approaches to define an outbreak using different summary statistics (i.e., recent mean, monthly
mean, moving mean, cumulative mean, and fixed incidence threshold). The authors recon-
firmed that outbreaks remain highly heterogeneous, in part due to location-specific transmis-
sion factors but also due to the methodologies used to define the outbreaks.
In summary, outbreak definitionsmay need to be spatially stratified, with consideration
given to available contextual data and summary statistics, and include operational perspectives
to best identify the most important stages of an outbreak in order to ensure a timely response.
Until consensus is reached on the most appropriate method to define outbreaks, definitions
using simple approaches such as the Endemic Channel should not be discounted. Although
outbreak definitions require further empirical work, they remain accessible to both programme
managers and regional epidemiologists alike, and if applied at relatively fine scales offer a useful
tool for outbreak detection, planning and response [25].
Alarmsignals for outbreaks
Syndromic surveillance [69] may contribute important data on alarm signals in early warning
systems for dengue outbreaks. A number of variables that provide predictive warning have
been identified and include the rate of school absenteeism [42–44], the volume of internet-
based health inquiries [45], the malaria negative rate in fever patients [46, 47], non-specific lab-
oratory requests (as malaria negativity rates or as thrombocytes requested), and fever alerts or
use of clinical syndromic definitions [48–51] and the proportion of virologically confirmed
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cases [52, 53]. Runge-Ranzinger et al. [19] also found six studies [52, 54–58] that showed sero-
type changes were positively correlated with the number of reported cases or with dengue inci-
dence, with lag times of up to 6 months, indicating that a change in serotypemay be a
predictor (alarm signal) for dengue outbreaks. Three studies [59–61] found that data on Inter-
net searches and event-based surveillance correlated well with the epidemic curve derived from
surveillancedata, suggesting that this methodmay be useful to predict outbreaks. Other
approaches such as the use of socioeconomic indicators (presence of water and trash collection
services) or environmental parameters (e.g., presence of tire repair shops, rainfall, relative
humidity) for risk assessment [62]. Modelling tools [63] also have potential, although at this
stage they remain either context-dependent or under evaluation.
In order to develop a dengue outbreak alert model, several potential alarm signals were eval-
uated retrospectively [25]. A simple approach combining the Shewhart method and Endemic
Channel was used to identify alarm signals that could predict dengue outbreaks. Five country
datasets were compiled by epidemiologicalweek over the years 2007–2013 and these data were
split to form a historic period (2007–2011) and evaluation period (2012–2013). To parameter-
ise the model, associations between alarm signals and outbreaks were analysed using logistic
regression during the historic period. Thereafter, these associations were combined with alarm
variable data during the evaluation period to predict dengue. Subsequently, model performance
was describedusing sensitivity and positive predictive value (PPV) (the proportion of false
alarms). Across Mexico and Dominican Republic, an increase in probable cases predicted out-
breaks of hospitalised cases with sensitivities and PPVs of 93%/ 83% and 97%/ 86% respec-
tively. In addition, an increase in mean temperature in Mexico and Brazil predicted outbreaks
of hospitalised cases, with sensitivities and PPVs of 79%/ 73% and 81%/ 46% respectively.
These results were particularly promising as these variables were broadly predictive of dengue
outbreaks across different countries, despite the varied surveillance systems, case definitions
and localised variation in transmission potential often associated with dengue [25]. Clearly,
routine surveillance can underestimate the true burden of disease, however the prediction of
cases was not hindered, as the case definition remained consistent throughout the historic and
evaluation periods and the systems were accurately reflecting the burden of disease.
Managerial capacity
Documented effective outbreak interventions and evidence gaps were analysed in a systematic
review by Pilger et al. [17]. Different strategies in the organization of outbreak response were
identified, showing that control activities for a dengue outbreak need to be multi-sectoral, mul-
tidisciplinary and multilevel; they also require environmental, political, social and medical
inputs for coordination so that successful activities of one sector are not weakened by the lack
of commitment from another. Risk communication is a fundamental element of managing a
public health threat by encouraging positive behavioural change and maintaining public trust
[26]. Outbreaks can be highly charged political and social events whereby “outbreak declara-
tion and transparency from expert to audience is surrounded by political and economic over-
tones” [64]. Therefore it is critical that risk communication plans are prepared prior to an
event and that individuals serving as spokespersons are provided with training in public speak-
ing and risk communication in order to proactively manage the outbreak response, along with
political or other issues that may arise [26].
The logistics of outbreak response activities are challenging. It is important to assess the addi-
tional human resources that will be required, both for clinical management of cases and vector
control. This includes redistribution of staff, increased staffing levels and extension of work shifts
[24, 70]. Overwork and subsequent demotivation of health staff have been identified as likely
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problems, often caused by increased demands by politicians and the community [7]. Therefore,
staff training and preparation for an outbreak in the inter-epidemic period and supportive super-
vision during the outbreak can help staff cope with excessive challenges during the outbreak [17].
Investment in human resources must come prior to the outbreak, thus outbreak response plan-
ning requires a section documenting the activities to be performed in the inter-epidemic period
in preparation for an outbreak, as opposed to preventative control. The contingency plan has
also to include the “stopping rules”, i.e., when and how to declare the end of the outbreak, halting
the outbreak response and continuing with routine interventions.
Vector control
Horstick et al. [7] undertook an analysis of vector serviceswith two methods: a systematic liter-
ature review and case studies that included stakeholder interviews and completion of question-
naires in Brazil, Guatemala, The Philippines, and Vietnam. In the systematic literature review,
staffing levels, capacity building,management and organization, funding, and community
engagement were found to be insufficient. The case studies confirmedmost of these findings,
with stakeholders reporting: 1) lack of personnel (entomologists, social scientists and opera-
tional vector control staff); 2) lack of technical expertise at decentralized levels of services; 3)
insufficient budgets; 4) inadequate geographical coverage; 5) interventions that rely mostly on
insecticides; 6) difficulties engaging communities; 7) little capacity building; and 8) minimal
monitoring and evaluation. Stakeholders’ doubts about service effectivenesswere widespread,
but interventions were assumed to be potentially effectivewith increased resources. The
authors highlighted the need for operational standards; evidence-basedselection/ delivery of
combinations of interventions; development/ application of monitoring and evaluation tools;
and needs-driven capacity building. These recommendations are in line with those from Pilger
et al. [17], who reported that combining interventions that involved vector control (elimination
of larval habitats with community involvement; appropriate use of insecticides in and around
houses) and capacity training of medical personnel, in combination with laboratory support,
were crucial for the successful control of outbreaks.
For single vector control interventions, systematic reviews are available on peridomestic
space spraying [12], Bacillus thuringiensis israelensis (BTI) [9], temephos [16], copepods [13]
and larvivorous fish [15]. Horstick and Runge-Ranzinger [65] found that: 1) vector control
could be effective, but implementation and coverage remained an issue; 2) single interventions
were probably not useful; 3) combinations of interventions had mixed results; 4) careful imple-
mentation of vector control measures may be most important; and 5) outbreak interventions
were often applied with questionable effectiveness.
A systematic review and meta-analysis found that community-basedmultiple interventions
(such as environmental management or clean up campaigns, refuse collection, the formation
of community working groups, socialmobilization strategies, water covers, and larviciding)
can signficiantly reduce vector densities [14]. Results from a cluster randomised controlled
trial in Latin America [28] reported reductions in dengue cases following similar interventions.
Bowman et al. [14] also reported that house screens on external doors and windows could be
protective against dengue transmission, but that there was insufficient evidence from random-
ized controlled trials to determine whether or not insecticide space-spraying or fogging could
impact dengue transmission. Best practices in vector control remain to be defined for any set-
ting (i.e., which tools or methods the community should employ), as well as what constitutes
adequate or sufficient coverage in order to impact the vector population and virus transmis-
sion. This includes operational aspects, quality of delivery and best combination of interven-
tions for successful vector control during outbreaks.
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Bowman et al. [14] also found no evidence that interventions such as mosquito coils, repel-
lents, bed nets, or mosquito traps could reduce dengue incidence. Finally, indoor residual
insecticide spraying and approaches involving the use of geneticallymodified (GM) mosqui-
toes or the intracellular symbiontWolbachia [66] have considerable potential for dengue vector
control, but have not yet been evaluated sufficiently to draw conclusions about their
effectiveness.
Clinical services
Good clinical case management during an outbreak has been crucial in reducing the case fatal-
ity of dengue from 10–20% to less than 1% in many countries over the past two decades [67].
The training of health professionals in diagnosis and management, as well as robust laboratory
facilities must be prioritized, as this will effectively dictate case management and influence
mortality rates. The best ways to achieve successful training may be through hands-on training
during ward rounds and case conferences [17]. The importance of emergency resources and
funding for outbreak response including clinical supplies has been highlighted as an important
element of preparedness and response planning [2, 24]. Badurdeen et al. [24] found that the
surge capacity of hospitals with recent dengue outbreaks varied. Hospital outbreak manage-
ment plans were present in 9 of 22 participating hospitals in Latin America and 8 of 20 partici-
pating hospitals in Asia, also highlighting the need for contingency planning. Further
information on triage systems, case management and referrals are available elsewhere [27].
Discussion
Preparedness planning starts in the inter-epidemic phase and success is dependent on the com-
bination of year-round routine activities, often established in a National Dengue Prevention
and Control Plan, up-scaling of routine vector control interventions and communication activ-
ities, and timely and systematically initiated additional measures during an outbreak. The pro-
posed handbook suggests seven areas for contingency planning which can either be integrated
into the existing national plan or developed as a separate add on. A summary of the recom-
mendations for dengue surveillance, outbreak alert and response are given below in Fig 2.
With respect to timely contingency planning, it is crucial to ensure that a context-specific
dengue contingency plan has detailed instructions that allowmanagers to distinguish between
routine interventions required during inter-epidemic periods and those needed during out-
break interventions (i.e., up-scaling of preventive interventions before the start of the “dengue
season” vs specific outbreak procedures). The contingency plan should ensure continuity
between timely surveillance (including multiple signals), outbreak alerts, and outbreak confir-
mation based on a clear definition, outbreak declaration, and finally implementation of contin-
gency responses. A key first step is to identify the person/ unit/ agency/ institution responsible
for specific activities, to define the roles and responsibilities of each person involved, to ensure
the regulatory framework exists to support and facilitate the contingency response, and to
ensure that the means and capacity exist to implement the full set of specified contingency
activities. This initial planning also takes into consideration the need for human resource pre-
paredness planning for all sectors including distribution of the plan to all stakeholders, instruc-
tions for training, and a detailed plan for monitoring and evaluation of preparedness activities
and response.
In order to optimize surveillance, a focus on reducing under-reporting and improving
reporting timeliness should strengthen routine surveillance systems. It is important to establish
a common understanding across all stakeholders on the purpose and objectives of surveillance,
to improve feedback of reported data and to provide a clear—ideally electronic—data flow.
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Enhancement strategies such as sentinel-based reporting, staff motivation, syndromic surveil-
lance, and monitoring additional alarm signals, e.g., virological, serological surveillance, should
be included along with use of the simplified and standardizedWHO 2009 [2] case
classification.
With respect to laboratory support, reporting available laboratory confirmation of cases to
the surveillance system is recommended along with information about the circulating sero-
type/genotype. The laboratory section of the national contingency plan should include details
on virus isolation, PCR, NS-1, ELISA, serological confirmation by IgM and IgG, appropriate
use of rapid diagnostic tests, storage of samples, and cold chain logistics (seeWHO [2]). The
purpose of laboratory tests, test results and their interpretation should be described and accom-
panied by a flowchart that visually depicts the timing of various tests and destinations of sam-
ples provided. Laboratory-specificprocesses of outbreak investigation and confirmation
should be defined, including quality control, capacity building, prevention of stock-outs, and
the role of different levels of laboratories within the national laboratory network.
The outbreak definition in a national dengue contingency plan should be context-specific
and based on the threshold of local historical disease data reported through the national sur-
veillance system. For example, countries may use the Endemic Channel where the threshold is
Fig 2. Conceptual framework of dengue contingency planning.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0004916.g002
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based on z standard deviations (SD) above the mean number of historic dengue cases (cur-
rently often z = 2, or according to recent evidence z = 1.25, which is close to the 3rd percentile
above the median). Efforts should be made to distinguish between standardized definitions of
an outbreak and the local/ national threshold used to initiate outbreak response, considering
that large spatial dimensions will result in the loss of information of localised transmission
dynamics. In addition to those mentioned herein, additional predictive variables, such as mete-
orological variables, in particularmean daytime weekly temperature, may be of use in local
contexts.
It is crucial to define an alert algorithm based on different alarm signals (epidemiological
thresholds plus the use of meteorological data, syndromic surveillancedata, laboratory results
or perhaps entomological metrics (although there is currently little evidence of quantifiable
associations between vector indices)) to increase sensitivity and specificity for predicting forth-
coming outbreaks. The outbreak response should be staged in accordance with the identified
level of risk (i.e., Initial Response, Early Response, Emergency Response) to ensure that
resources are used efficiently and proportionately.
From a managerial aspect, the organization of multidisciplinary response teams, details of
logistic/ operational considerations, including standard operating procedures, stopping rules,
monitoring and evaluation, staff training prior to an epidemic, resource mobilisation and finan-
cial management, legal framework, and recruitment of additional staff during outbreak response,
are all important issues for consideration. This includes the training of management personnel in
risk communication to ensure timely and appropriate communication within and without the
health sector and throughout the broader population. The process of outbreak declaration and
risk communication should be well defined and described, so that community engagement and
stakeholder involvement contribute to a successful outbreak response at the local level.
With respect to vector control interventions, the focus should be on quality and coverage of
vector interventions, as these remain key issues. The involvement of communities in vector
control activities, for example “search and eliminate”, increases the likelihood that expanded
coverage will be achieved; notably, community-based interventions can impact vector indices,
and some evidence exists for an impact on dengue incidence. House screening has demon-
strated an impact on dengue incidence and may be an effective intervention against dengue
where the context is appropriate. While limited evidence demonstrates a reduction in vector
indices following outdoor fogging, there is no evidence yet for an impact on dengue incidence.
With respect to clinical case management, timely alert of clinicians and a hospital outbreak
management plan that includes planning for additional beds and staff are essential. Ensuring
triage systems for case management, referrals [27] and mortality reviews will improve case
management. Disease transmission control in hospitals as well as regular and timely training of
hospital personnel must also be considered.
While gaps in knowledge and evidence still remain, much has been accomplished over the
past decade that provides a solid basis for evidence-basedcontingency planning.With the
WHO 2009 [2] dengue case classification, improved diagnostic tests and increased national
laboratory capacity, stronger national surveillance systems, and ongoing research to develop
algorithms that can be used in an operational setting, countries are in a better position to create
a dengue contingency plan that reflects their national and local contexts and optimizes avail-
able resources for outbreak response.
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